A critique of Prof. Nalin de Silva's "Sinhala Buddhist" views on epistemology - By Vasantha Raja
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A central tenet of Prof. Silva's philosophy - what he calls "Sinhala Buddhism" - is the rejection of the objectivity of concepts in relation to the external reality. Curiously, contrary to his outspoken attacks on western philosophy, in his Sinhala book Magay Lokaya (My World) he uses widely known Neo-Kantian arguments to justify his case. He admires Postmodernists and Prof. Paul Feyerabend presumably for their unmitigated hostility to claims of "objective knowledge". He seems to adore the mystical interpretation of some experimental results in quantum mechanics. Along with philosophical sceptics, Silva is scornful of all claims to the objectivity of conceptual knowledge.

His target is to go beyond philosophical scepticism and bring in Buddhist views on wisdom as a non-conceptual experience.

My task here is rather modest. The question whether "reaching the wisdom of the ultimate reality is a non-conceptual experience or not" does not arise within the scope of this article. My purpose is to challenge Silva's claim that humans' conceptual knowledge has no objective validity in relation to the external reality.

For clarity's sake let me counter-pose my own approach to conceptual knowledge right at the outset:

My conviction is that our concepts of the external world is an evolving phenomenon, in the sense a child's knowledge would develop through practical dealings with the surrounding world. Essentially, this process seems to me to be an objective process independent of cultural factors. The development of knowledge is a social phenomenon expressed through individual members of society; therefore, the possibility of making mistakes by individual members in specific knowledge claims should not jeopardize a scientific theory of knowledge that explains the development of conceptual knowledge through the unity and conflict of concepts (theory) and human activity (practice).

In ordinary human activity this process takes place in a haphazard manner, whereas in sciences there's a conscious effort to organize concepts consistently to be tested against the objective world. Thus, the limited nature of theories is constantly being exposed paving the way to enrich, expand or even radically transform them into new theories. This does not, however, mean all of the previous concepts are totally false. They have only been partly false, like in the ancient Indian parable of "six blind men and the elephant"

Let's briefly reflect on the parable: The one who touched the elephant's broad & sturdy side thought the animal must resemble a wall; the one who got hold of the trunk thought the elephant looked like a snake; and the one who felt a leg said it must be like a tree without branches; the one who felt the elephant's smooth, sharp tusk thought the beast had the shape of a spear, and so on. The point is: each observation is partly correct. Does this mean there's no chance they get a more or less accurate picture of the elephant as a whole? I don't think so. There are ways to correct their mistakes and obtain increasingly all-sided concepts of the elephant's real shape.

Suppose the blind men got together, discussed the differences and launch team work to figure out the real shape of the elephant. Obviously, a far more complicated picture would begin to evolve. In other words, their concept of the elephant's shape would now begin to systematically develop. [Remember, the evolutionary theory of knowledge does not harm democratic debate;on the contrary, it encourages debate from different angles, because different viewpoints are vital to the development of knowledge.] The important point to realise, however, is this: Conceptual development does not amount to a formal adding of partial pictures- like a jigsaw puzzle - to get the full picture. Every new development in this process is incommensurable with the past concepts even though the past concepts are indispensable for the emergence of the new.

Let's encapsulate the lesson we learned from the blind men's experience: Any new conceptual development of an object or a phenomenon would incorporate the old concepts of the same in an organic manner. Thus, the old concepts would undergo change in terms of the newly developed concepts: they get subsumed and become part of the new setup. In other words, they get redefined in terms of the new framework.

This logical incommensurability between theories has made many philosophers, including Prof. Silva, to conclude that any talk of getting closer to the truth is nonsensical. Also, they thought, without first knowing the full picture there's no grounds to believe that the 'developing' picture is approximating the absolute truth. But, it is humans' growing pracrtical abilities to deal with the external world that demostrate we are getting closer to the truth.

By limiting epistemological enquiry to language and mathematics - i.e. the symbolic aspect of knowledge - most philosophers have dislodged the crucial aspect of knowledge: human activity, or simply practice. Thus, they fail to see concepts, linguistic/mathematical symbols, sense-data and practical activity as dialectically related aspects of knowledge development.

[Note that my usage of "sense data" is different from Ayers', Russell's or Warnock's usage of the term. I use it in a non-verbal sense. I refer to the subjective (private)experience of the external world in the form of pictures, sounds, etc. as the causally-determined effect of the external reality on the subjective side of the mind via sense organs. Hence, it is important to distinguish sense-data from linguistic & mathematical symbols; even though, sense-data too play a symbolic role in the development of knowledge. Among them 'practical activity' is the anchor that connects the conceptual and symbolic aspects to the external world. Once that part is cut off all hopes of linking abstract concepts with reality are gone. No wonder Prof. Feyerabend ended up saying: "Anything goes!".]

Concepts embody the essence of past experiences in the form of abilities to select, link-up and interpret sense-data; they reflect the mind's potential to deal with the objective reality. Thus, although sense-data play a symbolic role - just as linguistic & mathematical signs do - in relation to human practice, they represent the point at which mind confronts the world and begins to penetrate the external reality via practice. The continual process of selecting, comparing, linking and interpreting sense-data is merely a manifestation of human practice. Remember, not just linguistic and mathematical signs but also sense-data would only have a symbolic value for us to 'see' the reality that lies behind the sense-data screen; and, we see it through our activity (practice).

Knowledge is not an entity embedded in your head to be discovered through a brain operation. Having concepts means having the ability to deal with linguistc, mathematical and sense-data symbols as a guide to deal with the objective world. But the question is: whose ability; and guide whom? The interiority (the subjective side) of the mind - which is an active force that consciously reflects the exteriority (the objective side) - seems to be the answer. Thus, it should be understood as the self-conscious subject's ability to use symbols as a guide to deal with the objectively perceivable reality. Seen from the objective side, developing knowledge means developing practice; and that means the development of the interiority (the subjective side) of mind where 'practice' is the external manifestation. Thus, the proof of continuous improvement of scientific knowledge - when scrutinized externally - is to be sought in the continuous progress in our ability to deal with the objective reality.[The use of the term 'our' is significant. For, the abstract knowledge expressed in linguistic and mathematical symbols is essentially a social phenomenon, not a private phenomenon. The practical abilities that correspond to abstract knowledge also reflect a social phenomenon. Thus, when we talk about the development of practice we again refer to a social phenomenon. But, obviously, these social phenomena can only exist through individual humans.]

Let me elaborate this point through a simple case: Competent tailors want to have abstract diagrams of their customers' shapes and sizes to make suits that fit them well. Mathematical diagrams - that embody socially transmitted knowledge and practice from generation to generation - would be more useful than thousands of photographic images taken from different angles and distances for them to do the job. An abstract drawing represents the 'real shape' for a tailor while the photos represent 'appearing shapes'. The 'real shapes' that come as the abstract diagrams are more real to a tailor than everything else.

But, in what sense are they more real, or more close to the truth than sense-data? Only as a guide to activity; to make suits that fit their customers.

Sense-data also play a symbolic role in guiding us to deal with a reality that is not directly given to our senses. We select, connect and interpret sense-data in terms of our abstract knowledge (theories, concepts etc). Nevertheless, conceptual networks are inseparably intertwined with corresponding abilities to deal with the objective world that exists independent of our thoughts about it. Remember, however, that is just the objective side, or the external manifestation, of knowledge-development. The ability itself resides in the subjective side of the active mind.

The backdrop to Pre-Einstein physics was the 'commonsense world-outlook' where bodies mechanically interact within absolute time and absolute space as separate categories. Before long, however, scientists confronted new phenomena involving vast distances and the speed of light that exposed the limitations of the Newtonian picture; the commonsense worldview began to crumble. A new world outlook (Einstein's theory of relativity) emerged where time-space and speed are inseparably intertwined. The commonsense outlook was subsumed within the new framework, and the Newtonian concepts' validity was restricted to areas where the impact of movement (speed) and distance is negligible.

The next big challenge to our evolving concept of the universe's general structure may come from quantum mechanics; particularly to see the micro-world's attributes essentially as those of universe's 'embryonic seed' that potentially contains the commonsense world of 'stable' spacetime objects. Many scientists would not see it that way yet. Instead, some see the 'micro-reality' as the only 'true' nature of reality that should replace our understanding of the macro-world. This mistake, I believe, stems from a failure to understand the universe's evolution in 'seed-product' terms. Thus, I think, the dragging crisis of quantum mechanics is of conceptual nature rather than anything else.

However, several major contributions towards resolving this conceptual impasse have occurred outside physics. Hegel, Karl Marx and Charles Darwin in their own ways have done their part to demonstrate that big chunks of the universe are evolving in a 'seed-to-product' relationship. Also, the implications of recent biological discoveries of the genome and related areas to a re-evaluation of the established methodological approach to reality seem to me to be of immense significance.

It took a long time to view the entire universe anything close to a 'seed-product' model; that is until cosmology came up with concrete evidence of universe's birth in a Big Bang and its subsequent evolution to the present stage. Yet, the micro-physicists do not seem to have figured out the full methodological implications of discoveries in other fields to the resolution of the quntum mysteries.

In other words, physicists have been dealing with a microscopic world - as opposed to the highly evolved macro-world mirrored in the theory of relativity - for quite sometime now. But they still do not seem to have quite figured out the possibility that they may be dealing with universe's 'embryonic egg' that contains the subsequent developments as a potential. The weird experimental results in quantum mechanics may just be an indication of micro-world's undeveloped nature. Certain circumstances, including human intervention via measurement, may be merely prompting an existent potential within the most basic forms of micro-phenomena to actualise into spacetime phenomena of neatly definable particles - a qualitative leap, a phase shift, into a new stage in our evolving universe.

Clearly, both quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity are incredibly successful in their own arenas. And the scientists are presently facing grave difficulties in unifying the two. The abyss between the microsphere and the macrosphere seems unbridgeable. But if you look at quantum mechanics and general relativity as mirroring two different stages in universe's hierarchical evolution the problem dissolves. If that is the case then they cannot be unified by reducing the latter to the former. Thus the task would be to find out the circumstances under which the microworld has given rise to a macroworld regimented by different laws.

The progressive development of concepts in relation to the general structure of our universe is also demonstrated in our growing ability to deal with the world. It is the mere focus on the symbolic aspect of knowledge (both language & mathematics) that misled academic philosophers.

Hand in hand with the growing knowledge linguistic & mathematical symbols too are getting more and more complex. They become meaningful only to those conscious actors who use them as a guide to deal with the objective world. It is on this basis that I reject the argument that all knowledge-claims about the external world have no objective validity.

Humans' practical abilities to change the world - building bridges, vehicles, houses, rockets, planes, semiconductors, medical scanners and so on & so forth- prove the objectivity of concepts. Man-made products, artistic creations (man-made changes in nature) are objective manifestations of the subjective consciousness; for, they first emerged in subjective minds before becoming part of the objective reality. They are the proof of the inseparable unity between the subject and the object.

Kant was wrong to create an unbridgeable gap between the subjective side of consciousness and the external reality. His dualism failed to grasp Mind's unbreakable link (practice) with the objective world. Ironically, it was Kant's agnosticism that provided the epistemological framework for the main pillars of contemporary western philosophy: Logical Positivism, Linguistic Analysis, Existentialism, Postmodernism etc. In theology, Kant's influence took the form of heavy dependence on 'blind faith' to justify a transcendent reality. Although all such schools of thought immensely contributed to new insights in many fields they lacked a scientific theory of knowledge to justify the objectivity of knowledge. Philosophical insights of Hegel, Marx et al countering Kantian 'agnosticism' - with profound revolutionary implications against the social status quo - were systematically ignored within mainstream philosophy.

Growth of practical abilities is the objective criterion of developing knowledge. Objectivity of knowledge is not a scholastic issue, but a practical issue, as Marx correctly pointed out. Mind's ability to transform reality is the proof of its conceptual objectivity.

Without quantum mechanics semiconductors, communication gadgets, MRI machines in hospitals etc., - are unthinkable. Relativity concepts are crucial, for instance, to all space travel. Newtonian theories are not adequate for such activity, though they are applicable to aspects of reality. Although the concepts within Newtonian physics & relativity are "incommensurable", both contain corresponding "practical abilities" that can demonstrate why the latter is higher than the former.

Yes, it is true, theories (concepts) are changing (rather, evolving) & the reality is also changing (rather evolving). But this only means that knowledge can only be an approximation. It, however, does not mean that there is no objective way of differentiating between sound knowledge and speculative fantasies.

As pointed out earlier, a tailor, for instance, would need to know the objective shape & size of Prof. Silva to make a suit for him. Otherwise, the suit wouldn't fit. Also, Prof. Silva would need objective concepts, for instance, to cross a road safely or drive his car. If all concepts are arbitrary creations of mind then all 'knowledge-claims' become epistemologically equal. Thus, visiting a doctor when Silva is ill or seeing a motor mechanic to fix his car etc., become epistemologically meaningless.

I think Silva's line of reasoning leads to scepticism and "My World"-type solipsism.The late Prof. Paul Feyerabend (whom Silva admires) also had been an ardent opponent of 'objective knowledge' who finally branded himself as an "epistemological anarchist" proudly using his catchy slogan, "anything goes". He described his approach: "epistemological anarchism". Thus, his unguarded enthusiasm for free, creative thinking has made him throw the baby out with the bathwater and open the door for total scepticism. Sadly, Prof. Silva seems to have got stuck in a similar trap.

In conclusion let me put in a nutshell how I perceive Prof. Silva's epistemological views in relation to western philosophy:

Prof. Feyerabend's attack on objectivity and rationality in his Against Method is a logical outcome of the epistemological contradictions western philosophy inherited from Kant. He has ruthlessly worked out the inescapable implications embedded in the Neo-Kantian world outlook. Postmodernism seems to be the most extreme victim of modern philosophy's failure to deal with Kant's dualism. [Hegel's and Marx's contributions towards transcending Kantian dualism has been either conveniently ignored or scornfully condemned by mainstream philosophy. In my view, most current philosophical schools never clearly understood the crucial role of practice in an epistemological context. Even some Marxists merely payed lip-service to the concept without clearly grasping what it involves.] Consequently, postmodernism had a free hand in exposing the inconsistencies within modern academic philosophy from a subjectivist viewpoint discarding all objectivist pretentions. In other words, it completely capitulated to scepticism in its denial of conceptual objectivity.

Its disastrous consequences for science can particularly be seen in relation to quantum mechanics. I refer here to contemporary philosophers' incompetence to provide the methodological rationale for scientists' magnificent achievements in quantum mechanics in probing into the embryonic stages of our evolving universe. The dragging quantum enigma, for example, has provided a field day for all kinds of mystical interpretations harmful for scientific progress. Prof. Silva's 'Sinhala Buddhism' seems to be just one of them that has cleverly made use of western philosophy's epistemological dilemmas. The solution to this, I believe, lies in the revival of dialectics as the logic of objective reality to explain the evolution of our universe (and the evolution of our knowledge of the universe) in terms of a 'seed-product' model. The reductionist 'simple-to-complex' approach presently dominant in sciences should be replaced by the dialectical 'seed-to-product' approch to reality.

Vasantha Raja ------------------------------------------------------------------------------